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AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRIVACY
ACT AND THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT:
IMPACT ON THE GOVERNMENT'S COLLECTION,
MAINTENANCE AND DISSEMINATION OF
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
by ROBERT R. BELAIR*
INTRODUTION

Purpose and Methodology of the Study
This article is based on a study conducted for the Commission on Federal Paperwork.' The study was developed through
an interview approach, the purpose of which was to identify and
analyze agency information practices for the collection, maintenance and dissemination of personal data which had been affected by the Privacy Act 2 and the amended Freedom of In3
formation Act.
The research focused on changes in agency practices within
three categories of information management. 4 First, I sought to
* Robert R. Belair is an attorney with the firm of Hill, Christopher
and Phillips in Washington, D.C. Mr. Belair was formerly Acting General Counsel of the Committee on the Right of Privacy, Office of the
President. He has served as a consumer attorney for the Federal Trade
Commission and as a staff member for the National Academy of Sciences
Project on Computer Data Banks.
He is a graduate of Kalamazoo College and Columbia Law School
and a member of the District of Columbia Bar, the American Bar Association and the Federal Bar Association Committee on Government Information and Privacy.
Mr. Belair recently served as a consultant to the Commission on
Federal Paperwork for privacy and freedom of information issues.

1. The Commission on Federal Paperwork was created by the Con-

gress in December of 1974 to "study and investigate statutes, policies,

rules, regulations, procedures, and practices of the Federal Government

relating to information gathering, processing, and dissemination, and the

management and control of these information activities." 44 U.S.C. § 3501
(Supp. V 1975).

The Commission has a two year life; however, because

of initial delays in appointing members, the Commission will not expire
until October of 1977. This article is based primarily on research done
for the Commission on Paperwork. However, the article is not a Commission report and the author is solely responsible for its content.
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V 1975).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 &Supp. V 1975).
4. The study has its limitations which should be underlined at the
outset. First, the equivalent of only twenty working days could be devoted to research. In all, approximately thirty-five individuals were interviewed including officials at ten agencies, congressional staffers, members of the press and representatives of oversight and guardian groups.
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determine whether the Acts had changed the character of the
personal information collected or the collection methods used.
Second, I tried to discover whether agencies had changed their
system of handling personal information as a consequence of the
Acts. Were different amounts or types of personal information
maintained? Was the information organized, audited, or secured
in a different manner? Finally, I attempted to identify the way
in which the requirements of the Privacy Act and the amendments to the Freedom of Information Act had affected agency
disclosure of personal information. 5
Even a brief methodology should make it clear that this
article presents a broadly gauged and somewhat impressionistic
overview of the effects of agency compliance with the Privacy
Act and the amended Freedom of Information Act. In the Spring
of 1977 the Privacy Protection Study Commission will publish
the results of an exhaustive analysis of agency compliance with
the Privacy Act. 6 At that point a large body of empirical information will be available against which to view the conclusions
of this article.
Because this article concerns agency practices for the
management of personal information, it focuses primarily on the
Privacy Act. The Freedom of Information Act's disclosure provisions, however, have a theoretical impact on many aspects of
personal information practices and hence the article deals with
both Acts.
Background of the Freedom of Information Act
and Privacy Act
Personal Data in Federal Files
The executive branch of the federal government collects,
maintains and disseminates a staggering amount of personal information. Agency reports submitted in compliance with Privacy Act requirements indicate that the executive branch has
6,723 systems of records that are accessed by personal identifiers,
5. The article uses the term "disclosure" in its broadest sense to
mean any sharing of information by the agency possessing the data in-

cluding inter- (but not intra-) agency transfers, subject access and public
dissemination.
6. Interview with Arthur Bushkin, Program Director Privacy Act

Implementation Study, Privacy Protection Study Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 29, 1976).

One section of the Privacy Act as passed,

Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 5, created the Privacy Protection Study Commission.
Simply stated, the Act directs the Commission to investigate, among

other things, the handling of personal information by the private sector
and recommend to the President and the Congress whether the principles
in the Privacy Act should be extended to private organizations.
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that is, identified by information personal to the subject. 7 The
first set of system descriptions consumed over 3,000 pages of
small print in the Federal Register. At last count federal data
systems were estimated to contain more than 3.8 billion records
about individuals." It is impossible to estimate the amount of
additional personal information held by federal agencies in systems that are not accessed by personal identifiers and hence need
not be reported.
For those systems about which agencies are required to publish reports, fifty-eight percent are maintained by three agencies:
the Department of Defense; the Department of the Treasury; and
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 10 Sixtyeight percent of this data is compiled in administrative systems
defined as data banks that deal with internal agency operations
such as personnel records, travel records, or parking permit
records. Thirteen percent of the government's personal records
are in domestic assistance program systems defined as data banks
that deal with the operation of federal assistance or benefit programs. Eighteen percent of the information is contained in other
data systems, including law enforcement, intelligence and financial systems." The Privacy Act and exemptions six and seven
in the Freedom of Information Act are, in large measure, a response to what the Congress perceived as a threat to personal
privacy posed by federal collection and use of such vast aggregations of personal information.
The Freedom of Information Act
Unless the information falls within one of the statute's nine
exemptions, the Freedom of Information Act requires written information possessed by federal agencies to be actively disseminated or promptly made available to any individual who requests
it. The requesting party, however, must reasonably describe the
material sought and comply with published agency rules concerning time, place and fees for disclosure. Exemption six permits
agencies to withhold "personnel and medical files and similar
7. The phrase "accessed by personal identifiers" means information
which is "retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying
number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (5) (Supp. V 1975).
8. See

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, FEDERAL PERSONAL DATA
SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT TO
OMB REPORT].
PRESIDENT at 2 (1975)

SYSTEMS

THE

[hereinafter cited as
9. The Privacy Act requires agencies to publish reports on "systems

of records," 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (4) (Supp. V 1975). That term is defined
in the Act to include only those records accessed by personal identifiers.

Id. § 552a (a) (5).
10. OMB REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
11. Id. at 4.
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files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. ' 12 The impact of exemption six has
been increased by the broad application it has been given by the
courts. 13 The "medical, personnel and similar file" language has
been largely disregarded in favor of a functional approach which
extends the exemption to almost any information if its disclosure
14
would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.
The Privacy Act
At roughly the same time that the 93rd Congress overrode
President Ford's veto and enacted legislation strengthening the
procedural aspects of the disclosure provisions contained in the
Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act was passed. The
Privacy Act sets detailed standards for the collection, maintenance, use and disclosure of personal information. Agencies
are admonished to "collect information to the greatest extent
practicable directly from the subject individual when the information may result in adverse determinations about an individual's rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs."' 5
This provision reflects a basic tenet of privacy and fair information practice-that an individual should be aware that the government is collecting information about him. 16 The Act further requires an agency to inform the subject individual of its authority
to collect such data, the purpose for collection, the routine uses, if
any, for the data and the consequences, if any, of refusing to
7
provide the data.1
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
13. See Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wine Hobby
USA v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974); Rural Hous. Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Robbles v. EPA, 484
F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). It should also be
noted that other FOIA exemptions may affect the handling of personal
information. For example, the (b) (3) exemption permits agencies to
withhold information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.
At last count, some 60 federal statutes are reached by (b) (3) including
several that limit the release of personal information. For instance, 26
U.S.C. § 6103 (1970) makes tax return information confidential. FOIA
exemption (b) (7) which limits public access to federal investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, also influences information
practices for personal data. It exempts disclosures from federal investigatory records where release would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (2) (Supp. V 1975).
16. Limiting the application of this standard in the way that the Privacy Act does to collection of information that can be used to make adverse determinations probably makes little sense from either a conceptual or practical standpoint.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (3) (Supp. V 1975). Office of Management and
Budget Guidelines issued pursuant to the Privacy Act interpret this section to apply only to subject individuals, but a good argument can be
made that it was meant to apply to third party sources as well. 40 Fed.
Reg. 28,948 (1975) [hereinafter cited as OMB Guidelines].
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The statute boasts a variety of provisions designed to
regulate agency organization and maintenance of personal data.
Agencies must identify systems of records that are accessed by
personal identifiers 8 and must publish an annual notice in the
Federal Register describing system subjects, the kind of material
on file, its routine uses and access instructions.19 Agencies are
also required to establish rules of conduct for persons involved
in the design, development, operation and maintenance of systems, 20 and to establish appropriate administrative, technical
and physical safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality
21
of personal information.
In addition to establishing procedural requirements for the
maintenance of personal data, the Privacy Act sets substantive
standards which govern the nature of personal information that
federal agencies can maintain. Only personal data that is relevant and necessary to accomplish a lawful purpose can be maintained. 22 Agencies cannot maintain a record concerning an individual's exercise of first amendment rights unless they do so
pursuant to statute, subject consent or an authorized law enforcement activity.2 3 Furthermore, if an agency uses information from a system to make judgments about an individual, it
must maintain that information with a degree of accuracy,
relevance, timeliness and completeness reasonably necessary to
24
assure a fair decision.
The Privacy Act also has extensive disclosure provisions.
Unlike the Freedom of Information Act which does not distinguish between disclosure to third parties and disclosure to the
subject individual, the Privacy Act sets substantive standards for
subject access to his records. The Privacy Act prohibits agencies
from relying on the exemptions in the Freedom of Information
Act to block disclosure of personal information to the subject 25and affirmatively requires agencies to allow individuals to review
their files upon request. 26 However, the Act makes blanket exceptions for access to records maintained by the Central Intelli18. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (4)-(5) (Supp. V 1975).

19. Id. § 552a(e) (4) (A)-(I).
20. Id. § 552a(e) (9).

21. Id.§ 552a(e) (10).
22. Id. § 552a(e) (1). The word "maintain" is defined to include
"maintain, collect, use, or disseminate." Id. § 552a (a) (3). Therefore, it
should be emphasized that this and other provisions that use the word

"maintain" can also be considered collection standards. For a good discussion of this point, see Project, Government Information and the
Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1303 (1975).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (7) (Supp. V 1975).
24. Id. § 552a(e) (5).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 552a(d) (1).
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27
gence Agency (CIA) and criminal law enforcement agencies.
It further permits any agency to withhold subject access to
systems of records that contain classified data, other investigatory
records compiled for law enforcement purposes, data maintained
to safeguard the President, data required by statute to be used as
statistical records, personnel investigatory material where disclosure would identify a source who furnished information under
an express promise of confidentiality and, under various circumstances, evaluative material used to make appointment or promofederal service and promotion decisions in
tion decisions in the
28
services.
the armed
Two additional provisions in the Act place specific limitations
on a subject's access to his records. One provides that nothing
in the access section shall permit an individual to see information
29
compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil proceeding.
Another provision permits agencies to establish special procedures for access to medical information including psychological
30
records.
In addition to subject access rights and limitations, the
Privacy Act also permits an individual to request an agency to
amend its records about him, to appeal any denials of that redenial, to add his own rebutquest and after final administrative
31
tal statement to the record.

As to third party disclosure, the Privacy Act's restrictions
in this area necessarily interact with the Freedom of Information
Act. First, the language of the two Acts must be compared. The
Freedom of Information Act requires disclosure to the public of
all information held by the government except where that information falls within one of the Act's exemptions. The Privacy
Act, on the other hand, prohibits disclosure except where the
type of disclosure sought falls within one of the Act's exemptions.3 2 Exemption two in the Privacy Act permits disclosure
33
where it is requiredunder the Freedom of Information Act.
Personal information will fall within the Freedom of Information Act's exemption six if its disclosure would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of privacy. This determination is made
by the agency itself. However, under the Freedom of Information Act, agencies have discretion to release information even if
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.§
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id.§
Id.§

552a(j)(1)-(2).
552a(k)(1)-(7).
552a(d) (5).
552a(f)(3).
552a(d)(2)-(3).
552a(b)(1)-(11).
552a(b)(2).
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it qualifies for protection under one of the exemptions. Because
the Privacy Act permits third party disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act only if the Freedom of Information Act
compels disclosure, the effect of the Privacy Act is to extinguish
agencies' discretionary disclosure powers to release information
under the Freedom of Information Act once such release is determined to be a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.
After a determination is made that disclosure of personal
information to third parties is not compelled by the Freedom
of Information Act, the Privacy Act and its exemptions control
disclosure. Several specific types of disclosure are regulated by
the Privacy Act's exemptions. For example, the Act authorizes
disclosure under compelling circumstances affecting an individual's health or safety, for statistical research, to the Bureau of
Census, to the National Archives, to a law enforcement agency
pursuant to written request, to either House of Congress and in
some circumstances its committees, and pursuant to court
4
order.8
Two additional disclosure provisions deserve special mention.
The Act provides for disclosure "to those officers and employees
of the agency which maintains the record who have a need for
the record in the performance of their duties. '3 5 Coupled with
the very broad definition of an agency, 3 6 this provision permits
agencies to share personal information within their agency virtually free of substantive or procedural checks.' 7
But perhaps the most controversial and difficult disclosure
provision in the Act is the exemption which authorizes disclosure for a "routine use."3'1 8 The Act defines a "routine use"
as a use that is compatible with the purpose for which the record
was collected. The legislative history indicates that the Congress
settled upon the routine use formulation in an attempt to insure
that the government's vital exchanges of information would continue to occur. 39 Critics have charged that as a disclosure
"safety valve," the routine use has exceeded Congress' wildest
dreams. It has been dubbed by many as a "routine abuse" and
40
this report discusses its operation at length.
34. Id. § 552a(b)(4)-(11).
35. Id.§ 552a(b) (1).

36. Id.§ 552a(a) (1).

37. Some authorities suggest that the intra-agency transfer provision
is limited by standards in subsection (e) (10) which, among other things,
requires agencies to establish appropriate administrative safeguards to
insure the confidentiality of records.

38. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (3).

"Routine use" is defined in subsection (a)

(7) and is required to be published under subsection (e).
39. 120 CONG. REC. H10,962 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974); id. S21,816
(daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974); id. H12,244 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974).

40. See text accompanying notes 159-64 infra.
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Before concluding this background review, a few final comments need to be made about the Privacy Act's disclosure provisions. First, under the Privacy Act, disclosure of personal
information even where authorized is always permissive, never
mandatory. Guidelines issued by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) properly stress this point. 4' Agencies can never
directly rely on the Privacy Act as authority for a mandatory
disclosure of personal information to a third party. Second, the
Act requires agencies to maintain an accounting or audit log of
disclosures except for intra-agency disclosures or disclosures
mandated by the Freedom of Information Act. 42 Thus, individuals who wish to learn the identity of at least some of the parties
that have seen their records can inspect all audit logs except for
accountings of disclosures made pursuant to the Act's law enforcement disclosure exemption. 43
Furthermore, third parties who have received disclosures for which an audit trail is
maintained must also receive notice of corrections or dispute
44
notations made in a record.
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

Agency Collection of Personal Information
One of Congress' principal purposes in passing the Privacy
Act was to reduce the amount of personal information collected
by the executive branch. The OMB Guidelines emphasize the
Act's collection restriction mandate.
A key objective of the Act is to reduce the amount of
personal information collected by federal agencies to reduce the
risk of intentionally or inadvertently improper use of personal
data. In simplest terms information not collected about an individual cannot be misused. The Act recognizes, however, that
agencies need to maintain information 45about individuals to discharge their responsibilities effectively.
But this objective does not appear to have imposed an active
or voluntary change upon agencies' information collection prac41. Section 6 of the Privacy Act as passed, Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 6,

direots the Office of Management and Budget in the Executive Office
of the President to develop guidelines and regulations for agency compliance and provide continuing implementation oversight. From the outset,
OMB has been reluctant to commit staff or resources to this effort.
Furthermore, OMB takes a modest view of their authority to issue binding regulations for agency compliance. In the context of these restraints,
most observers agreed that OMB has done an outstanding job. OMB
created a temporary inter-agency task force initially to review agency
Privacy Act rules; it has issued two formal sets of guidelines, published
the first annual report and is presently compiling a cost report.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (c) (Supp. V 1975).
43. Id. § 552a(c) (3).
44. Id.§ 552a(c) (4).
45. OMB Guidelines, supra note 17.
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tices. Instead, most officials interviewed agreed that the Privacy
Act has "grandfathered in" collection activities that were underway in 1974 and 1975.
Because of the "relatively short time available to meet the
requirements of the Act" many agencies simply adopted existing
record systems and identified and reaffirmed collection and
maintenance levels, reserving a reevaluation of their systems for
a later time. 46 Although this study found few examples of
actual voluntary discontinuance of significant information collection programs, 47 several agencies have purged some personal
data systems and many have at least reviewed their information
collection activities.
Personnel Suitability and Security Clearance Investigations
The Act has, however, had an impact in certain areas of
information collection. The most frequently cited example of decreased information collection activities concerns federal personnel suitability and security clearance investigations. The alleged
change in collection practices was by no means the result of a
volitional determination by investigating agencies that as a result
of the Privacy Act they should reduce the amount of information
collected. Instead, changes were purportedly the result of restrictions imposed by the Privacy Act.
Perhaps, the Department of Defense has been the most
vociferous critic of the impact of the Act in this area. One member of the Defense Privacy Board charged that,
the impact of the Privacy Act provisions on security clearance
investigations has been severe. The 'pledge of confidentiality'
no longer prevails. For this reason the information submitted
during security clearance investigations is less subjective in
nature. The problem is of sufficient magnitude that a change
in investigative techniques may result. 48
46. The OMB REPORT, supra note 8, was helpful in evaluating some
of the information gathered in this study. Although the report does not
specifically address the issue of information collection, it does consider
the effect of the Act upon the magnitude of personal record keeping in
the executive branch. Here, as elsewhere, the line separating collection
and maintenance of information is a thin one. If agencies maintain less
personal information, there should be both a direct and indirect impact
upon agency collection practices as reflected in the consistency between
the developments reported by the Office of Management and Budget and
the findings of this study.
47. The OMB REPORT indicates that 18 of the 85 agencies surveyed
had reviewed and reduced the amount and nature of information retained
on individuals in existing systems although they had not eliminated any

system in its entirety. Eight agencies indicated that they had eliminated
"information and duplicate files." Furthermore, "agencies indicated that
data collection forms are being reviewed more closely to assure that only

the minimum information necessary is requested." OMB REPORT, supra
note 8, at 12.
48. Interview with Defense Privacy Board, in Washington, D.C. (July
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Representatives of the Defense Investigative Service maintain that because federal investigators must now inform sources
that the contents of personnel suitability and security clearance
interviews are available for the subject's inspection, the quantity
and quality of the information collected in these interviews have
deteriorated. This development has allegedly occurred notwithstanding the fact that the Privacy Act permits agencies to deny
the subject access to information that would reveal the identity
of confidential sources.4 9 Defense Investigative Service spokesmen admit, however, that they do not have data to document their
charge and that there is no evidence that the amount of time devoted to personnel investigations has either decreased (presumably because agents are receiving fewer leads) or increased (presumably because agents must interview more sources to obtain
the same amount of information) .50
Sources at the Defense Investigative Service also claim that
a growing number of sources are requesting confidential treatment of their identity.5 1 A spokesman described an investigation
of a nineteen year old serviceman who allegedly had a severe
drug problem. Eight sources confirmed the subject's drug
problem but all requested confidential treatment. Spokesmen
explained that because witnesses know that the subject may gain
access to his file "there is a general reluctance to be a public
52
source."
The Defense Investigative Service also experienced a mild
decrease in the amount of information collected in its personnel
27, 1976) (by Messrs. Horton, Vargas and Brown of the Commission on
Federal Paperwork). The Defense Privacy Board is an intra-agency Department of Defense organization with policy and adjudicative responsibility for administration of the Privacy Act.
49. The head of an agency may promulgate rules to exempt a system
from access if the system of records is:
investigative material compiled solely for the purpose of determining
suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal contracts, or access to classified information, but only to the extent that the disclosure of such material
would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to
the Government under an express promise that the identity of the
source would be held in confidence ....
5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) (5) (Supp. V 1975).
50. Interview with William Cavaney, Executive Secretary, Defense
Privacy Board; Colonel Aurelio Nepa, staff director, Defense Privacy
Board; Robert Kelly, Director, Information Control Division, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and representatives of the Defense Investigative
Service, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 30, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Cavaney Interview]. Defense Investigative Service representatives
point out that they have not attempted to collect data to document
their argument.
51. The OMB Guidelines, supra note 17, rightfully discourage agencies from giving witnesses a promise of confidentiality. Confidential

treatment of data frustrates the access provisions in the Act and substantially diminishes the utility of the interview.
52. Cavaney Interview, supra note 50.
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and security clearance investigations and a mild increase in the
number of witnesses who requested confidential treatment.5 3
Defense Investigative Service District Commander Reports show,
for example, that the Raytheon Corporation, among many others,
now requests confidential treatment for its reports that contain
derogatory or adverse employment information. One field report
related that:
[a] greater number of sources either declined to furnish information or request to be a confidential informant. During the first
month of implementation of the [Privacy Act], most every
agency, employer, etc. required extensive briefings before continuing to furnish information. Some declined completely, others
reduced54 the amount of information to which they would permit
access.
In general, however, concerns expressed at the Department
of Defense about the Privacy Act's effect on personnel investigations were not shared by officials at other investigative agencies.
The prevailing view is that the Act has created few problems
for those conducting investigations and examples of difficulties
appear to be the exception rather than the rule.
A spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
noted that his agency has had little difficulty in collecting personal information and has not experienced an increase in the
number of witnesses who request confidential status. 5
Although some CIA intelligence operatives apparently have complained that a few of the agency's confidential sources are more
reticent since the passage of the Privacy Act and the amendment of the Freedom of Information Act, CIA sources caution
that there is no way of determining if this alleged reticence is
a result of the Acts or the unprecedented public scrutiny that
has recently been directed at the Agency. In any event, the CIA
does not have significant data pointing to a decrease in information collection activities.5 6
53. E.g., District Commander Field Report to the Defense Investigative Service (March 16, 1976).
54. Id. Several field reports said that some state and local governments and private organizations initially misunderstood the applicability
of the Privacy Act. They labored under the impression that they were
somehow covered by the Privacy Act. Therefore, some organizations refused to disclose personal data to the federal government that they had
previously supplied.
55. Interview with Gene Wilson, Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, in Washington,
D.C. (Nov. 4, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Wilson Interview].
56. Id. As a single example of reduced collection, a CIA spokesman

reported that some foreign intelligence agencies have informed the CIA
that they are now reluctant to supply the Agency with information, including personal information, for fear that it might somehow become
part of the public domain. Id.
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At the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), sources did
not think that the Bureau's collection activities in personnel investigations have been affected by the collection restraints in the
Privacy Act or by the disclosure provisions in the Freedom of
Information Act. 7 One FBI source, however, gave an example
of the Act's impact on information collection. According to the
source, the FBI had made arrangements with an American businessman to attend a trade meeting allegedly organized by the
Russian KGB. The FBI's informant backed out at the last
minute, citing the Freedom of Information Act as his reason.
The informant allegedly feared discovery of his identity because
he felt that the FBI would not be able to protect the data that
he would collect.
Similarly, officials at the Civil Service Commission, which
performs the largest number of civilian personnel and security
clearance investigations in the executive branch, do not feel that
the Privacy Act affects the amount or character of information
obtained in these investigations.5" In the months immediately
following the effective date of the Privacy Act, officials at Civil
Service Commission headquarters received numerous complaints
from field investigators that the Privacy Act restrained them
from collecting sensitive and derogatory information. Headquarters review of the interview reports, however, has convinced officials that there has been no such effect. They speculate that
most witnesses do not understand the Privacy Act or its consequences and therefore it is not surprising that the Act has not
changed the nature of their responses.5 9
Effect on Other Information Collection Programs

Other than the alleged limited impact that the Acts may
have on federal personnel and security clearance investigations,
sources interviewed at a number of agencies could provide only
a few examples of collection impact on other programs. At the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare it was reported
that officials in HEW's vocational rehabilitation programs complain they now receive less information from state provider agen57. Interview with Dick Dennis, FBI Special Agent, FOIA/Privacy

Unit, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Dennis
Interview].
58. Interview with Robert J. Drummond, Jr., Director, Bureau of Personnel Investigations, Civil Service Commission; Walter Waldrop, Deputy Director; and Joseph Durrand, Staff Member, in Washington, D.C.
(Nov. 1, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Drummond Interview].
59. Id. It is unwise to draw conclusions from a comparison of the
Defense Investigative Service with other agencies such as the Civil
Service Commission because each of these agencies conducts a separate

and somewhat unique investigative program.
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cies because of the Privacy Act. Many vocational rehabilitation
patients receive Social Security Administration disability payments. Officials of state provider agencies have a responsibility
to inform the Social Security Administration of the continuing
extent of the subject's disability after the subject's completion
of the state-operated rehabilitation program. Social Security
Administration officials complain that because state officials
know that their patients can use the Privacy Act to obtain their
files, state officials are reluctant to provide information that
might result in the termination or reduction of the patients'
benefits.60
Effect on Collection from Subject
There had been some speculation that subjects themselves
might be less inclined to provide agencies with information because the Act requires that they be given an explanation of the
agency's authority for collecting the data and its uses for the
information. The OMB Report states, however, that no agency
reported any change attributable to this provision.
The Act requires that individuals from whom information
about themselves is solicited be apprised of the purposes for
which the information is sought so that they can make an informed judgment as to whether to provide it. No agencies
reported any measurable change in the willingness of individuals
to provide non-mandatory information .... 61
Agency sources surveyed for this study corroborated the OMB
Report and cited only a few rather quixotic examples that suggest that individuals are now in fact more reluctant to provide
62
information as a result of the Act's notice provisions.
The study also looked for voluntary actions taken by agencies to reduce the amount of personal information that they
collect. No significant examples were found. Sources at many
agencies did say that the agencies have adopted a policy to reduce the amount of personal information collected. However,
when pressed, they usually added that their agency had not as
yet adopted any concrete or formal procedures to review the
present level of information collected or to make reductions.
60. Interview with Edward Gleiman, Director of Fair Information
Practices Staff, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, in Wash-

ington, D.C. (Nov. 3, 1976) [hereinafter Gleiman Interview].
61. OMB REPORT, supra note 8, at 14.

62. Interview with Robert Ellis Smith, Editor of the Privacy Journal,

in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 9, 1976)

[hereinafter cited as Smith Inter-

view]. In its decennial Census test runs, the Census Bureau, for example,
apparently has had difficulty with its Privacy Act disclosure notices. The

Bureau has discovered that if it informs individuals as it must under
the Privacy Act, that failure to reply to its questions may result in penal-

ties, including jail, respondents are so unsettled or angry that they may
refuse to answer,
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Methods of Collecting PersonalInformation
By and large agencies have not changed their methods of
collecting personal information. Despite the Privacy Act's prescription that information should be collected to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject, no source was able
to provide any evidence that his agency had changed its collection practices to focus more specifically upon the individual.
Many of those interviewed pointed out, however, that their
agency already collected the vast bulk of its personal information
directly from the subject. This view of agency collection practice is shared by most expert observers.6
The notice requirements of the Privacy Act have had some
impact upon agency collection methods. The collection notice
provisions in section (e) (3) of the Act require each agency maintaining a system of records to:
inform each individual whom it asks to supply information, on
the form which it uses to collect the information or on a separate
form that can be retained by the individual(A) the authority (whether granted by statute, or by executive order of the President) which authorizes the solicitation of
the information and whether disclosure of such information is
mandatory or voluntary;
(B) the principal purpose or purposes for which the information is intended to be used;
(C) the routine uses which may be made of the information,
as published pursuant to paragraph (4) (D) of this subsection;
and
(D) the effects on him, if any, of not providing all or any
part of the requested information .... 64
The (e) (3) notice has been subject to two major criticisms.
First, agency officials complain that production of (e) (3) notice
forms has been expensive and burdensome. They point out that
the Act, if read literally, requires Privacy Act notices even for
the most inconsequential collection activities. The effect of this
provision from a paperwork standpoint has been considerable.
For example, at the Department of Defense, 15,000 forms require
the Privacy Act's (e) (3) statement.6 5 The Department of Defense decided that pending depletion of its existing stock of
forms, the (e) (3) notice should be placed on a separate sheet
of paper distributed with or attached to data collection forms.
63. Interview with Louise Becker, Analyst in Information Services,

Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, in Washington,
D.C. (Nov. 18, 1976).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (3) (Supp. V 1975).

65. Briefing Presentation by the Defense Privacy Board to the Privacy Protection Study Commission at 15 (Jan. 16, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as DPB Briefing].
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Other agencies, including HEW, have adopted a similar ap68

proach.

Second, agency sources charge that most subjects ignore the
(e) (3) notices although those interviewed did provide a few
examples of instances where subjects appeared to pay attention
to the (e) (3) notice. For example, the Social Security Administration claims that the (e) (3) notice causes interviewees who are
entitled to benefits to take a longer period of time to answer
questions and they in turn now raise a greater number of ques67
tions.
Effect on New Information Collection Programs
While agencies have not appreciably changed existing collection activities to comply with the Privacy Act or the
amended Freedom of Information Act, there is some reason to
suspect that the Acts have discouraged agencies from developing new information collection programs. Admittedly, it is difficult to prove this impact because there is no way to determine
what new collection programs agencies would have instituted had
not the Privacy Act been passed or the Freedom of Information
Act strengthened. Nevertheless there are a few indications that
the Privacy Act in particular has an impact on new information
collection programs. Subsection o, "Report on New Systems,"
of the Privacy Act requires
[e]ach agency [to] provide adequate advance notice to Congress
and the Office of Management and Budget of any proposal to
establish or alter any system of records in order to permit an
evaluation of the probable or potential effect of such proposal
on the privacy and other personal or property rights of individuals or the disclosure of information relating to such individuals,
principles
and its effect on the preservation of the
68 constitutional
of federalism and separation of powers.
OMB's Guidelines state that the subsection is intended to assure
that proposals to establish or modify systems of records are made
known in advance so that OMB and the Congress will have a
66. Interview with Edward Gleiman, Director of Fair Information
Practices Staff, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 13, 1976).
67. Interview with Franklin Reeder, Office of Management and
Budget, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Reeder
Interview]. Mr. Reeder has been directly responsible for OMB's Privacy
Act oversight activities. The Social Security Administration has been
unable to document this claim. The (e) (3) notice has also caused problems at naval medical facilities. The (e) (3) notice used at these facilities was written in such a way that it created the impression that if individuals refused to sign the "acknowledgement of receipt of notice,"
they would not receive medical care. This misunderstanding created an
uproar and the notice was subsequently reworded.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o) (Supp. V 1975).
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basis for monitoring the development or expansion of record
keeping activities and the Privacy Protection Study Commission
will be able to review trends in the collection of personal information. 69
As a practical matter, the new system notice requirement
puts agencies on the alert that new information collection activities may be subject to close scrutiny. As such, the Act establishes a disincentive to create new systems. Sources at the Office
of Management and Budget estimate that since the effective date
of the Privacy Act, September 27, 1975, agencies have published
approximately two hundred new system notices. 70 When this
figure is compared with the nearly 7,000 initial system notices,
it suggests that there is a reluctance to initiate new collection
activities because of a desire to avoid the scrutinization of collection methods that the publication of new system notices might
bring. An OMB official, for example, reported that the Navy
had planned to conduct an extensive attitudinal study of personnel who were slated to be sent overseas. The Navy now plans
to scale down the program, primarily because of external scrutiny
but at least in part out of concern that collection of extensive
data in this fashion would require publication of new system
71
notices.
A similar development was reported at the FBI. The Bureau
has apparently considered establishing a new record system
which would consist of information on known or alleged terrorists. Some of this data is already available in other FBI files,
but much would have to be obtained from new collection activities. Those activities are not underway at least partly because
the FBI is reluctant to create a new system of records and
72
thereby trigger the new system notice requirements.
Sources at other agencies, however, have denied that they
have altered information collection plans to avoid the new system notice requirement. A CIA official stated that the Agency
has fifty-seven record systems and is not reluctant to publish
new system notices. According to this official, the CIA's mission
and its record keeping activities are simply too important to permit essentially tangential considerations to control. Nevertheless
73
the CIA has yet to publish a new system notice.
In view of the fact that the Privacy Act places direct requirements on agency collection practices, it is surprising that it has
69. OMB Guidelines, supra note 17, at 28,977.
70. Reeder Interview, supra note 67.
71. Id.
72. Dennis Interview, supra note 57.
73. Wilson Interview, supra note 55.
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had little impact in this area. Research indicates that agencies
continue to collect the same kind and quantity of personal information; that agencies have not altered their procedures for
personal information collection nor given much attention to developing plans for review of their information collection activities. Indeed, no agency official was able to produce one
document that contained a program for review or restructuring
of collection activities. Agencies that have changed their collection procedures as a result of the Privacy Act have limited the
changes to mechanical alterations specifically required for compliance such as the (e) (3) notice.
On the other hand, the study does suggest that the Privacy
Act and to a lesser extent the amended Freedom of Information
Act have had two general effects on agency information collection practices. First, most agency sources were quick to emphasize that their agency has become more thoughtful about its
personal data collection practices. Most officials stated that their
agency was committed to an early review and reform of information collection practices. Second, this new information consciousness, when coupled with Privacy Act system notice requirements, may work to discourage initiation of new information
collection programs.
Agency Handling of Information
In addition to discovering the impact of the Privacy Act and
the amended Freedom of Information Act on agency collection
habits, one of the principal goals of this study was to look at
the impact of the Acts on the manner in which agencies handle
personal information. At the outset it is important to clarify
the scope of this discussion. The ability to define its information
needs, to set priorities for data, and to use information effectively
determines the success that an agency will have in achieving its
goals. Naturally, I did not attempt to evaluate the ability of executive branch agencies to discharge their responsibilities or
otherwise perform critical governmental functions. Rather, I
looked at factors that pertain to the impact of the Privacy Act
and the Freedom of Information Act on agency maintenance of
personal information.
I sought to determine first, whether agencies had changed
the organization or content of their files. Second, I investigated
whether agencies had adopted new and different audit procedures in an effort to assure that their files met standards
prescribed by the Acts. Third, I tried to discover whether agencies had implemented new security procedures for the handling
of personal information. Finally, I sought to determine whether
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agencies had instituted new personnel rules and/or training pro-

grams for the handling of personal information.
Impact of Title 44

By way of background, it is worth noting that the executive
branch's maintenance of personal information is affected not
only by the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act,
but also by a number of other statutes and sources of policy.
One of the most important is title 44 of the United States Code.
Section 3101 of that title authorizes the heads of federal agencies to compile and maintain such information as is adequate to
document the agency's functions, policies and essential transactions.74 Section 3102 requires agency heads to establish record
management programs that assure effective control over the
creation, maintenance, and use of records.7 5 Title 44 contains,
therefore, the basic statutory authority for executive agency information maintenance and retention programs.
Furthermore, title 44 authorizes the Administrator of the
General Services Administration (GSA) to monitor and review
executive branch information management practices. Specifically, the Administrator is directed to make surveys of record
and record management practices, promote and improve the use
of information, and report to the Congress and the Office of
Management and Budget. 71 Section 2906 permits the General
Services Administration to inspect records maintained by federal
77
agencies.

Title 44 also sets standards for information disposal pursuant
to GSA coordination. Agencies are required to identify information in their possession that is no longer needed in the transaction of their business or that does not otherwise warrant preservation. Under title 44 agencies are required to submit a destruction schedule to GSA for information falling within either of
those two categories. 78 The Administrator submits these schedules to Congress' Joint Committee on Printing. If the Committee
has no objection, GSA then authorizes the agency to adopt the
record disposal plan. Under emergency circumstances, GSA unilaterally can authorize an agency to destroy information where
that data constitutes an immediate menace to health, life, or
property. 9 Agencies are prohibited from disposing of any written document except pursuant to these procedures.80
74. 44 U.S.C. § 3104 (1970).
75. Id. § 3102.

76. Id. § 2904.

77. Id. § 2906.

78. Id. § 3302-3303.
79. Id. § 3310.

80. Id. § 3309.
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Impact of Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act
However controlling title 44 is, there is much in both the
Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act which should
have an enormous impact on agency handling of personal information. From the fact that the Freedom of Information Act
makes information held in federal files public, many felt that
the statute would have influence on the manner in which agenMore specifically, because the
cies maintain information.
amended Freedom of Information Act requires agencies to segregate information so that public information can be disclosed and
nonpublic information appropriately protected, 8 ' observers believed that agencies would organize their files to reflect the public and nonpublic distinction.
At the same time, the Privacy Act contains specific directions
concerning the handling of personal information. The statute
requires agencies to: identify and describe systems of records
that are accessed by personal identifiers; establish rules of conduct for persons involved in the operation and maintenance of
the records; establish technical and physical safeguards to insure
the security of the information; maintain only personal data that
is relevant and necessary to accomplish a lawful purpose; and,
in most circumstances, exclude from personal files information
concerning that individual's exercise of his first amendment
82
rights.
Annual System Notices
The Privacy Act requires every agency to identify annually
its record systems that are accessed by personal identifiers and to
publish system notices in the Federal Register that describe the
subjects in the file, the kind of material, its routine uses, and
83
the procedures a subject can use to gain access to his record.
Agencies had approximately nine months from the time that the
Act was passed until its effective date to undertake a comprehensive review of their personal information record keeping.
Many observers hoped that a high degree of agency awareness
and understanding of their record management practices would
emerge from this process. Observers also thought that agencies
would make significant changes in their record management
practices, well beyond the specific requirements of the Privacy
Act. Instead, this study suggests that agencies emerged from
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). FOIA case law has
long made it clear that agencies should segregate public and nonpublic
information.
82. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (4) (Supp. V 1975).
83. Id. § 552a(e) (4), (11).

484 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 10:465
their nine-month review period without a well defined sense of
how record management practices could be reformed to improve
efficiency and effectiveness or to better meet the objectives of
the Privacy Act. The nine-month review process was described
by sources as something of a "blitzkrieg." Officials attempted
to make sense of what they perceived to be a vague and abstruse
statute and a baffling amount of personal information and to
describe it in system notices-all under severe time and manpower restraints. Not surprisingly, it appears that most agencies
did little to change their methods of handling personal information beyond the minimum necessary for compliance with the
Privacy Act.
Organizationof Agency Files
Most agency sources reported that their agency had not
changed its manner of organizing record systems accessed by personal identifiers. OMB officials emphasized this point after
many months of reviewing agency system notices and advising
84
agencies on implementation questions.
Perhaps one reason why agencies have not reorganized their
files in light of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy
Act is that most simply have not received enough access requests
to make it worth their while to do so. For example, subsection
(f) (3) of the Privacy Act permits the establishment of special
procedures for subject access to medical information. Most
agencies have interpreted this provision to permit them to disclose medical information to a subject's physician but not to the
subject directly. Therefore it would be reasonable to expect that
many agencies would change their files, segregating medical information to permit subject inspection without the subject seeing
the medical data. Instead, most agencies have continued to
handle medical information exactly as they did prior to enactment of the Privacy Act, probably because they have received
a limited number of access requests or because in some instances
medical data is already segregated. It is more cost efficient to
audit a file and remove medical data on an individual access basis
than to initiate a wholesale reorganization of the system.
Although some agencies are faced with numerous requests
from individuals interested in viewing their files, they have
found it unnecessary to reorganize their systems. Sources at a
number of agencies, particularly those in the intelligence and
criminal justice communities, said that files in their agencies have
always been carefully organized according to proper record
84. Reeder Interview, supra note 67.
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management procedures and agency needs, so that there has been
no need to reorganize the files.85 Furthermore, officials point
out that under the Act their files can be exempted from many
requirements such as relevance, timeliness, etc., that would logically lead an agency to consider restructuring its files.
Minor Changes
The findings of the study show that a few agencies have
made minor changes in the organization of their files in a constructive attempt to meet the requirements of the Acts. The
Civil Service Commission has altered the form of investigative
reports used in personnel and security clearance investigations.
Because the Privacy Act permits witnesses to request confidential treatment of any information that would reveal their identity, the Commission restructured its reports so
that witness identification information could not be viewed by
the subject. Prior to enactment of the Privacy Act, investigative reports were organized to commingle the witness' evaluation
of the subject with the witness' biographical data. Reports have
now been reorganized so that one section is devoted exclusively
to an identification of the witness and a second section is devoted
86
exclusively to subject evaluation.
Similarly, other agencies segregate files to separate public
and nonpublic information. In particular, agencies that collect
substantial amounts of business data and are therefore subject
to frequent requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act, have adopted filing schemes under which information is
classed and filed as public or nonpublic at the point of collection. 87 The Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug
Administration have adopted variants of this filing system. The
Office of Civil Rights at HEW and the Justice Department reportedly use this approach to a limited extent.88 A few sources
85. Interviews with officials at the CIA, FBI and Defense Investigative Service, supra notes 55, 57 and 50 respectively.

86. Drummond Interview, supra note 58, and interview with Phillip
Schneider, Associate Director for Manpower Information, Civil Service
Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 5, 1976) [hereinafter cited as

Schneider Interview].

87. Interview with Jack Schwartz, Staff Attorney, Office of the Gen-

eral Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 8,
1976)

[hereinafter cited as Schwartz Interview]; interview with Jeffrey

Edelstein, formerly an attorney in the General Counsel's Office at the
Federal Trade Commission and now the Chairman of the Federal Bar
Association's Committee on Government Information and Privacy, in
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 3, 1976); interview with Thomas Susman, Chief
Counsel, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Susman Interview].

88. See note 87 supra; Smith Interview, supra note 62.
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speculated that the organization of information to accommodate
access requests (such as segregating medical information, third
party data, confidential source data, removing irrelevant or untimely data, etc.) was the intelligent approach and one which
eventually many agencies would surely adopt.
Purge of Systems
Many observers had great expectations that the Privacy Act
and the amended Freedom of Information Act would induce
agencies to purge existing systems. The OMB Report suggests
that, although most agencies have not significantly reduced the
amount of personal information that they maintain, at least some
have eliminated a few personal record systems. 89 In addition,
sources at many agencies said that the Privacy Act has encouraged their agency to destroy information. Agency officials, however, could not point to anything substantial to document this
claim. It was noted that although the Act does give agencies
an incentive to reduce the amount of personal data in their files,
natural bureaucratic instincts to maintain data, coupled with the
provisions in title 44, make it extremely difficult for an agency
to destroy information.9 0
A couple of officials reported that their agency had recently
applied to and received approval from the Archives for new and
shorter purge schedules. Officials at the Defense Investigative
Service reported that a new purge schedule had been adopted
with shorter time periods for the destruction of personal information. 9 1 The FBI has also apparently changed its purge schedule. The Bureau now destroys misdemeanor information after
ten years and felony conviction information after twenty years.
Previously the FBI had maintained such data indefinitely.
Whether this change is a consequence of the Privacy Act, the
FBI's recent public exposure, or a combination of both, is difficult to determine. 2
The FBI, as well as the CIA and the IRS
have testified that they would like to purge a number of record
systems including several containing especially sensitive political
and first amendment data, collected as a part of their
COINTELPRO CHAOS and SPECIAL SERVICES PROJECTS,
3
respectively.
89. OMB REPORT, supra note 8, at 12.
90. Interview with Mary Lawton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, in Washington, D.C.

(Nov. 3, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Lawton Interview].
91. Cavaney Interview, supra note 50.

92. Dennis Interview, supra note 57.
93. Congress placed a moratorium on the destruction of these records
pending further evaluation of the data banks.
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The Civil Service Commission reportedly purged a few
record systems containing personal data systems in anticipation
of the effective date of the Privacy Act. 94 For example, prior
to enactment of the Privacy Act, the Commission maintained a
file of newspaper clippings on selected individuals. This file system has now been eliminated. The Civil Service Commission also
previously maintained a system with information that appraised
the promotion or potential of selected employees. This system
was likewise destroyed and such data is reportedly no longer developed by the Commission.9 5
Changes to Circumvent Acts
Some agencies have reorganized their files in an effort to subvert or avoid Privacy Act requirements. It has been reported
that particular organizations no longer file certain sensitive
information in record systems that are identified by personal information. Record systems which are not identified by data personal to the subject are not covered by the Privacy Act. Instead
the Act covers information about an individual maintained in
a system of records that is accessed by personal identifiers.
Critics point out that permitting the Act to be turned on and
off by the method of6 access is an open invitation to agencies to
9
circumvent the Act.
Another device used by agencies to avoid Privacy Act
requirements is the creation of temporary or informal files.
Material that should be placed in permanent files (and that was
previously contained in such files) is now maintained informally
and/or temporarily to avoid the creation of files subject to
Privacy Act regulation. The Department of Justice, for example,
no longer has a file for attorney applicants. Instead, resumes
and related correspondence are maintained in an informal manner, shuffled from desk to desk and then destroyed when no
97
longer needed.
94. Schneider Interview, supra note 86.

95. Id.
96. Lawton Interview, supra note 90. Most sources were naturally

reluctant to identify specific examples of personal information that had
been hidden in systems not accessed by personal identifiers. Neverthe-

less, there are reports, for example, that merit promotion files at the Civil
Service Commission are now maintained in systems that are not accessed
by personal identifiers. Another example is the Department of Justice's
access request log, which contains the names of individuals who have
accessed information in files that are covered by the Act. The access

request log is organized so as not to be accessed by personal identifiers.
97. Id. The Privacy Act does not make an exception for temporary
or informal files except to the extent that such a file is not "under the
control" of the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (5) (Supp. V 1975).
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Observers further charge that law enforcement agencies are
keeping information in open investigatory files after an investigation is terminated. This practice avoids the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act because an exception
permits agencies to withhold information in investigatory files
where disclosure would compromise an enforcement proceeding.9 8 There has also been an alleged increase in agency use
of oral communication. Agencies may be using oral communications to exchange some information that would previously have
been exchanged and memorialized either exclusively or additionally in written form. The Department of Labor has reportedly
instructed its Office of Safety and Health Administration to communicate orally with the subjects of its investigations when possible.9 9 According to one source, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation recently distributed a memorandum to its employees advising them that they should attempt, where possible, to
communicate on the telephone instead of in written form.100
Although the memorandum did not say so, one reason for this
recommendation may have been to avoid the creation of written
information that would be subject to the requirements of both
the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act. 01'
One of the most interesting examples of potential changes
in agency handling of information is the formation of so-called
"data havens." There is some reason to believe that federal
agencies may "hide" data, including personal information, in systems maintained by organizations that are not subject to the Privacy Act or the Freedom of Information Act. In many instances
this information would have been maintained by the agency
itself prior to enactment of the statutes. For example, it is
reported that HEW personnel no longer accept possession of
copies of General Accounting Office audits, but instead travel
to the offices of the General Accounting Office (an arm of the
Congress not covered by the Acts) to look at information that
HEW normally would have maintained in-house. 10 2 The extent
of the "data-haven" development could not be documented in
this study, but insofar as the executive branch is subject to
standards that are more rigorous than those applied to other
organizations, agencies have an incentive to look for such havens.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (A) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

99. Susman Interview, supra note 87.

100. Id.
101. Interestingly, the disclosure provisions in the Privacy Act cover
any method of communication. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b) (Supp. V 1975).

102. DOMESTIc COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY, NATIONAL
INFORMATION POLICY: REPORT TO THE PREsIDENT at 51-52 (1976).
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Auditing of Files
Neither the Privacy Act nor the Freedom of Information Act
specifically requires agencies to audit files containing personal information. Nevertheless, along with the reorganization of files,
many observers expected agencies to implement audit programs
to help insure that their personal information systems met standards in the Acts. It appears, however, that no such development
10 3
has occurred.
The consequence of failing to audit files properly was
recently brought to the attention of two executive branch agencies. Six Fort Riley soldiers have brought suit against the
Department of Defense for its alleged failure to maintain their
personal records with the accuracy, relevance, timeliness and
completeness necessary to insure that fair decisions can be
made.1 0 4 In Emory v. Laise, an aggrieved subject has instituted
suit against the Department of State, charging that files maintained on the plaintiff contained "erroneous and scandalous mateerial in violation of the Privacy Act."'10
Only a few officials reported that their agency had adopted
any new audit procedures as a result of the Act. The Civil Service Commission has undertaken a comprehensive audit program
to expunge information in its files concerning subject exercise
of first amendment rights. However, the program only applies
to "archival" files from which information is about to be used.
The opinion of the Civil Service Commission's General Counsel
describes the scope of the program:
Finally, we concur in your proposal to screen investigative files
assembled before the effective date of the Privacy Act for impermissible information at the time they are released rather than
immediately. Technically speaking, these old files are 'maintained' by the Commission. However, they are maintained as
archives and not as current files in an active operating system.
To the extent that they are inactive or purely archival, there
is no real need to screen them, until such time as they are
released or reactivated for some purpose other than archival.
Because these files are in storage and not used, i.e., not 'maintained for active use,' there is little or no chance that the information contained in them will be misused. The potential of such
misuse is the actual basis for the Act's embargo on 'maintaining'
First Amendment related information. We recommend then, that
a procedure be established to systematically screen all investigative files retrieved from the Commission's storage banks and to
expurgate all proscribed information from those files.'L 6
103.
104.
105.
106.

Reeder Interview, supra note 67.
Topeka Kansas Journal, April, 1976.
421 F. Supp. 91 (D.D.C. 1976).
Memorandum from Carl F. Goodman, General Counsel to Robert
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The Civil Service Commission has requested a $500,000 authorization in the Commission's budget to conduct this audit program. 107 According to staff sources, even this kind of limited
of substantial manpower by exaudit involves the commitment
10
ecutive level employees. 8
The Department of Defense has added Privacy Act criteria
to its Inspector General's audit program. The Inspector General's office performs an annual audit of Department of Defense
performance and, since 1975, the review has included a determination of whether information in systems covered by the Act,
is timely, accurate and relevant. Inspector General evaluations
are conducted once a year on a spot check basis and Department
of Defense spokesmen do not claim that these investigations constitute an in-depth evaluation of the Department's compliance
with the Privacy Act.1" 9
In general, the study discovered that auditing is given a low
priority by federal agencies. Possibly, the absence of specific
audit requirements in the Acts makes it difficult for agencies
to commit resources to the effort. It may also be that the Act's
requirement that files be maintained with a degree of accuracy,
relevance and timeliness requisite to the making of a fair decision, is a standard simply too vague and subjective to mean much
to agency record keepers. In any event, at present it appears
that agencies only audit files (if at all) immediately prior to
access by the subject or release to third parties.
Security

One of the Privacy Act's primary considerations for the
handling of personal information is the physical, administrative
and technical security of the system. If "confidentiality" is the
promise to keep personal information from falling into the public
domain, then security is an organization's ability to keep that confidentiality promise. Subsection (e) (10) of the Privacy Act
requires agencies to "establish appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of records and to protect against any anticipated
threats or hazards to their security or integrity which could
J.Drummond, Jr., Director, Bureau of Personnel Investigations on Protection of First Amendment Rights Under the Privacy Act (Nov. 7, 1975).
107. Reeder Interview, supra note 67.
108. Drummond Interview, supra note 58. Approximately one-half of
the time of the Director and Deputy Director of the Bureau of Personnel
Investigation at the Civil Service Commission is devoted to Privacy Act
matters, a substantial part of which includes the first amendment audit
program.
109. Cavaney Interview, supra note 50.
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result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience or unfairness to any individual on whom information is maintained."110
In view of this specific mandate, together with the increased
awareness of the sensitivity of personal information, the fact that
many systems are protected by such simplistic physical security
measures as locked filing cabinets and doors, and the government's failure to use sophisticated, technical means to safeguard
computer data,1 1' many observers expected wholesale changes
in agency security procedures. Here too, it appears that compliance efforts have fallen short. In general, sources believed that
prior to the enactment of the Privacy Act, security procedures
for systems containing personal information were already more
than adequate. The OMB Report describes the feeling of most
agency officials:
Agency reports indicate that they have been able to develop
physical and administrative safeguards for systems subject to the
Act. Eight agencies indicated that no new safeguards were
necessary beyond giving specialized instructions to personnel.
Fifty-five agencies outlined security procedures, although not all
identified them as new procedures established in response to the
Act. For example, many agencies cited security measures such
as bolting, guards, lockable rooms and cabinets and limited access
to records, safeguards which in many cases were in existence
before September 27, 1975. Most agencies apparently concluded
that security safeguards already in place augmented by increased
staff awareness of the need for safeguarding personal information
are adequate to meet the requirements of the
2 Privacy Act for
the majority of systems which they maintain."
Consequently, little has been done to improve security and most
agencies apparently did not closely review security systems prior
to making the determination that they were adequate.
A few agencies, however, have taken specific action to implement the Privacy Act's security standards. The Department of
Defense has reworked its procedures, making changes in security
measures for new automated systems." 3 HEW has also done
work in this area, establishing a task force to examine security
questions for all systems containing personal information, focusing initially on automated systems.'1 4 For the moment, however, it appears that security procedures have changed little since
the passage of the Privacy Act.
110. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (10) (Supp. V 1975).
111. OMB REPORT, supra note 8, at 16. See also Turn, Privacy and
Security in Centralized Versus Decentralized Databank Systems, 7 POL'Y.
Sci. 17 (1976).
112. OMB REPORT, supra note 8, at 15.
113. DPB Briefing, supra note 65, at 18.
114. Gleiman Interview, supra note 60.
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Personnel Rules
If the executive branch in fact altered significantly its
method of collecting, handling or disseminating personal information, it was believed that the change would manifest itself
in new personnel rules and training programs. The Privacy Act,
subsection (e) (9), requires agencies to:
establish rules of conduct for persons involved in the design, development, operation, or maintenance of any system of records,
or maintaining any record, and instruct each such person with
respect to such rules and requirements of this section, including
any other rules and procedures adopted pursuant to this section
and the penalties for noncompliance. 1 ' 5
Pursuant to this directive, the Civil Service Commission
revised the Federal Personnel Manual to include changes in per11
sonnel record keeping practices required by the Privacy Act.
Additionally, it has issued regulations governing personnel security investigations under the Privacy Act,' 1 7 has conducted
a training course on the Privacy Act for federal employees and
specific personnel and has developed a two-day general course
that is available to most federal agencies. 1 18
The Department of Defense has also undertaken a major
effort to meet the concerns of subsection (e) (9). It has budgeted
$2.4 million to train personnel over a period of twelve to
eighteen months" 9 and has issued Training Reg. 5400.11 which
1 20
sets out the substance of the training program.
Other than the Department of Defense and the Civil Service
Commission, however, it appears that few agencies have implemented new personnel rules or programs to govern employees
who handle personal information. 121 It is worth noting that
the Department of Justice which enforces the Freedom of Information Act has done little to encourage the implementation of
training programs to effectuate compliance with the Act. Indeed, the Attorney General's Freedom of Information Act implementation memoranda in 1967 and 1974 are viewed by many
115. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (9) (Supp. V 1975).
116. 40 Fed. Reg. 45,904 (1976).
117. 40 Fed. Reg. 56,651 (1976).
118. OMB REPORT, supra note 8, at 10-11; Schneider Interview, supra
note 86.
119. Interview with William Cavaney, Executive Secretary, Defense
Privacy Board, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 9, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Cavaney Interview #2].
120. For an early discussion of this training program, see DPB Briefing, supra note 65, at 13-25.
121. The FBI claims that it has changed its internal training program
to emphasize Privacy Act concerns, but no written evidence was supplied.
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observers as negative and unhelpful statements that in fact
12
discourage agency compliance. 2
AccESS

TO AND DISSEMINATION OF

GOVERNMENT-HELD PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

There is no information policy issue more significant than
that of public access to government-held personally identifiable
information. Decisions controlling access to such information
shape the relationship of individual and government. Today
there is general agreement that increased public access to most
kinds of government-held information develops a well-informed
electorate, promotes trust in government, and improves governmental responsiveness and integrity. There is also general agreement that personal information should be treated as an
exception to an open door policy of public access. But once beyond affirmation of such vague principles, there is sharp disagreement over the extent to which personal information should
be available to the public.
The dissemination and access issues are discussed under four
headings: (1) the Privacy Act's system notice requirement;
(2) access requests; (3) intra- and inter-agency transfers of information within the federal government; and (4) the flow of information to and from state and local governments and private
sector organizations.
System Notices
The Privacy Act requires agencies to publish annually a
12
notice of the existence and character of their record systems.
System notices are descriptions of each record system that an
agency maintains detailing, for instance, the categories of individ124
uals covered by the system, its purposes and its routine uses.
The public notice requirement is crucial to the primary purposes
of the Act-elimination of secret record systems containing personal information and agency accountability through a system
12
of public scrutiny. .
The annual system notice requirement constitutes an impressive and perhaps the major paperwork burden placed upon agencies by the Privacy Act. The first batch of annual notices, pub122. Interview with Harold Reylea, Freedom of Information Act
Specialist at the Congressional Research Service, in Washington, D.C.
(Nov. 18, 1976).
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (4) (A)-(I) (Supp. V 1975).
124. For examples of system notices see the Department of the Treas123.

ury's notice publication in 40 Fed. Reg. 37,602-37,910 (1974).

125. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948 (1975).

494 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 10:465

lished for the most part in August and September of 1975,
consumed over 3,200 pages of small print in the FederalRegister.
Unfortunately, however, the system notice requirement has
been relatively ineffective. There is widespread belief throughout the federal bureaucracy that members of the public neither
read nor have general access to the Federal Register. Apparently, therefore, individuals who make access requests seldom,
if ever, base their requests upon information obtained from the
Federal Register. The CIA, for example, reported that out of
almost 5,000 access requests, only nine used system notice or request format information found in the Federal Register to make
the request.12 6
Perhaps because of the public's unfamiliarity with the
Federal Register, one "information entrepreneur" recently established a Privacy Act access request service. For $15.00, Freedom
of Information Services, Inc., will file an access request and
follow-up request with any one of about a dozen federal
agencies.'
Access Requests
Role of the Freedom of Information Act
Despite the apparent lack of interest in or knowledge of
system notices, there is no doubt that since the adoption of the
Privacy Act and the amendment to the Freedom of Information
Act, the number of access requests received by federal agencies
has increased dramatically. The Freedom of Information Act
provides that written information that cannot be sheltered from
distribution by one of the Act's nine exemptions must be made
available to any individual who requests it, provided that the
requesting party reasonably describes the material and complies
with published rules concerning time, place and fees for the disclosure.
Short and strict time limits govern agency response to access
requests. The government must determine whether to comply
with the request within ten working days and must promptly
notify the requesting party of its determination. If an application is rejected, the individual has the right to one administrative
appeal which must be determined within twenty working
days.1

28

Under unusual circumstances, agencies may extend

126. Wilson Interview, supra note 55.
127. See Use Abuse of Freedom of Information Act, Washington Post,
July 27, 1976.
128. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (A) (i)-(ii) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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the ten and twenty day time limits, but in no event may the
1 29
delay exceed ten additional days.
Information may be withheld only if the data comes within
one of the Freedom of Information Act's nine exemptions. No
other legal grounds exist upon which to base a refusal. 13 0 But
the exemptions are permissive, and therefore, unless otherwise
restrained, agencies are free to ignore the availability of an exemption and to release the data. 13 1 Cases reflect this discretion in holding that the exemptions must be narrowly construed
and ambiguities resolved in favor of disclosure. 1 32 Critics, however, charge that agencies tend to withhold information mechanically where an exemption will apply without determining if
there is any particular reason why that information should be
133
withheld despite the availability of the exemption.
Freedom of Information Act applicants whose requests are
rejected on administrative appeal may seek a district court order
compelling the production of the documents. Unless given additional time by the court, agencies must answer Freedom of Information Act complaints within thirty days. Courts look at the
requests de novo and the burden is squarely upon the government to justify nondisclosure. 1 3 4 If the court finds for the complainant, it can award court costs and attorney's fees.' 35 Moreover, if the court finds that agency personnel acted arbitrarily
or capriciously in withholding the information, it can direct the
Civil Service Commission to initiate an investigation to determine
whether disciplinary action is warranted. 13 6 To date, however,
neither the courts nor the Civil Service Commission have shown
137
much enthusiasm in exercising this disciplinary authority.
129. Id. § 552(a) (6) (B).

130. See Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065

(S.D.N.Y. 1974). There is much debate among legal scholars concerning
the availability of the executive privilege doctrine as a discrete authority

for withholding documents.

131. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp., 508 F.2d 945 (4th
Cir. 1974).
132. Literally dozens of decisions have adopted this interpretation.
See, e.g., Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Cuneo v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d
1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996
(D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
133. Interview with Mark Lynch, Attorney for Freedom of Information
Clearinghouse, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 14, 1976) (by Phillip Vargas
of the Commission on Federal Paperwork) [hereinafter cited as Lynch

Interview].
134. See Seafarers International Union AFL-CIO v. Baldovin, 508 F.2d
125 (5th Cir. 1975); Washington Research Project v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (E) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
136. Id. § 552(a) (4) (F).

137. Lynch Interview, supra note 133.

496 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 10: 465

Role of the Privacy Act
As noted in the background section, the Privacy Act prohibits disclosure of personal information except to the subject
individual or with the subject's written consent or where the
disclosure falls within one of the Act's exemptions. Since one
exemption permits disclosure when it is required by the Freedom
of Information Act, access request procedures found in that statute may be followed. Additionally, some of the Privacy Act exemptions set forth minimal access request procedures for disclosure to third parties. For instance, disclosures to a government
agency for a civil or criminal law enforcement activity must be
pursuant to written requests specifying the particular portion of
13
the record that is needed.

However, the Privacy Act's access request procedures are
most detailed with regard to subject individual requests. The
Privacy Act provides that each agency that maintains a system
of records shall:
upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or
to any information pertaining to him which is contained in the

system, permit him and upon his request, a person of his own
choosing to accompany him, to review the record and have a
copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form comprehensible
to him, except that the agency may require the individual to
furnish a written statement authorizing discussion of that
139 individual's record in the accompanying person's presence.
The Act provides civil remedies for a wrongful refusal to
comply with a subject individual's access request and empowers
the courts to enjoin the agencies from withholding the requested
information. In such a case the court is to consider the request
de novo and in camera to determine whether there are grounds
in the Act for withholding the record or portions of it from the
subject individual. Attorney's fees and other reasonable litigation costs may be recovered when the complainant prevails in
0

14
such a suit.

The Act also provides specific procedures to be followed for
subject individual requests to amend the record and insert rebuttal statements. Agency review and civil remedies are available
to the subject individual for the wrongful refusal to comply with
4
such requests.' '

138.
139.
140.
141.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (7) (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 552a(d) (1).
Id. § 552a(g) (3) (A)-(B).
Id. § 552a(d) (2)-(3), (g) (1).
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Individual Deluge of Access Requests
By the effective date of the Privacy Act, many agencies, particularly those in the criminal justice, intelligence and regulatory
communities, were inundated with access requests from private
individuals. An initial wave of access requests overwhelmed
some agencies and created grave processing difficulties for many
others. During 1975, for example, the CIA received 6,609 access
requests. 142 The Justice Department received 30,000 requests
of which 14,478 were addressed to the FBI. 1 43 The Department
of Treasury, including the IRS received another 30,000 requests. 1 44 By summer of 1976, the CIA had a backlog of 2,400
requests. At the FBI, the backlog ran as high as 8,400 requests
145
and created processing delays of nine months.
The Justice Department, in its Freedom of Information Act
report to the Congress, complained that the deluge of access
requests threatened to compromise the Department's ability to
perform its substantive missions.
In reviewing all of the data submitted herewith, I must state
that much of it is disturbing to me and others interested and
involved in FOIA matters. The receipt of over 30,000 requests
for access, a number far in excess of what anyone had anticipated,
has transformed this into a major area of departmental operations. Over 120,000 manhours are reported as having been expended, the majority by attorneys and supervisors, and these
constitute only a partial accounting for the total personnel effort
within the Department. These figures demonstrate the adverse
impact on this Department's ability to carry out its traditional
substantive missions during the past year. Moreover, the figures
for the first two months of 1976 offer no indication that the tide
is ebbing. Through March 5, for example, the Federal Bureau
in excess of 2,500 new requests for
of Investigation has received
46
access to its records.'
Number of Access Requests Declining
By the fall of 1976 interviews conducted for this study indicated that the number of requests had decreased at both the CIA
142. Freedom of Information Act: Burdensome, Costly, Much Used,
Washington Post, July 25, 1976. Most agencies do not distinguish FOIA
and Privacy Act access requests. The requestor is given the greatest
amount of information that he is entitled to under both Acts.
143. Id.
144. FOIA ANNUAL REPORT (1976).
145. Id. See also FBI Slow to Free Information, Washington Post.
July 30, 1976; Demands of FOIA and Privacy Act on the FBI: Hearings
of the Civil and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1976) (statement of
James M. Powers).
146. Letter from Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice to Bella S. Abzug, Chairwoman, Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Government Operations (March 15, 1976).
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as well as the FBI. At the CIA, access requests that had been
running as high as 100 per day had dropped to an average of
ten per day by November of 1976.147 The FBI reported a somewhat smaller decline. Unlike officials at the CIA, FBI sources,
however, are not optimistic about the future curve for access requests. 148 The FBI also reports that its access request load is
extremely sensitive to publicity. For instance, shortly after CBS
Network News featured a Freedom of Information Act story, the
FBI received 1,042 access requests in a single day.
Agencies outside the criminal justice and intelligence communities generally report that they are able to process their
access request load with little difficulty. For example, both the
Department of Defense, with an estimated 44,400 access requests
in 1975, and the Civil Service Commission, which is currently
averaging ten access requests per day, indicate that they are well
able to process this flow. 14 :9 Indeed, in some agencies, the
number of access requests has been almost disturbingly small.
The OMB Report describes the typical agency experience:
most agencies have not reported a substantial number of requests. Those agencies which have reported perceptible increases in requests for access to records are for the most part engaged in law enforcement/investigative activities (e.g., IRS and
FBI). They have been unable, however, to segregate requests
for access as a result of the Privacy Act from those resulting
from the Freedom of Information Act. Agencies' reports other
than those from the law enforcement agencies indicate that most
requests for access were being made by Federal employees.
This tends to support the assertion that the public at large was
not aware of mechanisms established by the Act during the first
months after it became effective, and that Federal employees
are more informed as a result of extensive training given them
incident to implementing the Act. 150
Agencies that attempt to distinguish Freedom of Information Act
and Privacy Act requests find that the number of requests pur147. Wilson Interview, supra note 55.
148. Many observers believe the Department of Justice and particularly the FBI have a degree of concern, if not hostility, for the Privacy
Act not found at other agencies. However, in fairness to the Bureau it
should be pointed out that congressional staff members responsible for
FBI oversight argue that the Bureau's recent efforts to comply with FOIA
and the Privacy Act have been sincere and effective. Interview. with
Alan Parker, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, House Committee on the Judiciary, in Washington, D.C. (Jan.
21, 1977). Publicly and privately, Justice officials complain that the Acts
cause interference, frustration and loss of morale within the Bureau.
They cite, for example, the celebrated FOIA request for access to the
Rosenberg spy case files. Compliance with the request cost the Bureau
over $261,000. To date the Rosenberg children have not bothered to inspect the documents. Dennis Interview, supra note 57; Lawton Interview, supra note 90.
149. Cavaney Interview #2, supra note 119; Drummond Interview,
supra note 58; Schneider Interview, supra note 86.

150. OMB

REPORT,

supra note 8, at 15.
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suant to the Privacy Act in particular has been low. For example, the FTC reports that it has processed only 200 Privacy
Act requests since the effective date of the Act, almost all of
which were from employees and were handled promptly and
15
amicably. 1
Agency Overreaction
Passage of the Privacy Act and the amendment to the Freedom of Information Act undoubtedly permits individuals to
obtain more personal information from their federal files. It is
unclear, however, if the Acts have changed the nature or the
amount of personal information that executive agencies release
to the public generally.' 52 Initially, in an attempt to avoid
violations of the Act, agencies relied upon withholding provisions
under both statutes and may have released less information in
certain areas than they normally do.
During 1975, executive branch agencies relied on the privacy
exemption in the Freedom of Information Act 3,856 times to
withhold personal information. 153 Observers report that the
Department of Justice is reluctant to discourage agencies from
using Freedom of Information Act exemptions for fear that agen5 4
cies will complain to Congress.'
In addition to reliance on the Freedom of Information Act's
exemption to withhold personal information, some agencies, particularly in the first months after enactment of the Privacy Act,
may have relied improperly upon the Privacy Act to deny individuals access to information that previously had been public.
The OMB Report describes this phenomenon:
Another key objective of the Act is to assure that personal information is not used for purposes other than those for which
the information was collected without the consent of the individual to whom the information pertains. This provision and the
complex set of criteria under which information may be released
151. Schwartz Interview, supra note 87.

152. A fear expressed by critics is that under the crunch of access

requests agencies will inevitably release sensitive information that ought

to be protected. So far only one such occurrence has been documented.

The IRS apparently improperly released over 90 pages of law en-

forcement investigatory documents to an indicted Chicago lawyer allegedly involved in a $700,000 tax evasion scheme. See Too Much FOIA
at IRS, Washington Post, July 28, 1976. In a related phenomenon, FBI
officials point out that over 10% of their access requests come from
inmates in various penal institutions. They fear that one result of
providing this data to inmates is that inmates may discover the Bureau's modus operandi in investigating criminal cases.
153. See Harold C. Reylea, The Administration of the Freedom of
Information Act: A Brief Overview of Executive Branch Annual Reports for 1975 (Sep. 2, 1976).
154. Lynch Interview, supra note 133.
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without the consent of the individual initially caused substantial
confusion and operational problems. 155
A newspaper story carried by the Washington Bureau News
Service illustrates the initial overreaction to the Privacy Act.
A State mental hospital official won't tell a worried son that
his missing mother has been checked into the hospital. Sorry
Privacy Act. A policeman won't tell a lawyer whether his
client has been arrested. Sorry Privacy Act. A school official
won't tell the local newspaper who plays the kazoo in the school
band. Sorry Privacy Act. The Secret Service won't release the
list they have compiled of public court actions. Sorry Privacy
Act. All over the country the Privacy Act is being invoked by
various officials in and out of government as a reason for not
releasing information, information which has often formerly been
available to the public. 156
Another story carried by the wire services during this period
described a State Department lawyer who delayed publication
of the Department's biographical register of foreign service
agents because he feared that disclosing directory information
15 7
would violate the Privacy Act.
Intra-and Inter-Agency Transfer of Information
Abuse of Routine Use Provision
Under the Privacy Act inter-agency transfers of sensitive
personal information may be accomplished pursuant to a routine
use notice. The routine use concept does not pertain to the frequency or normalcy of a transfer but rather looks to the compatibility of the use. Information falls within the Privacy Act's
routine use exemption and may be exchanged by agencies if it
is to be used for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose
for which the information was first collected, 158 provided that
the agency possessing the information has published an appropriate routine use notice. Under these circumstances a transfer may
be made even though the subject has not consented to the transfer and even though the information, if disclosed to the public,
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. As
such, the routine use concept represents a compromise. It attempts to reconcile agencies' need to share sensitive personal information with the Congress' desire to limit sharply the transfer
of such information and, indeed, to give the individual subject
control over such transfers.
155. OMB REPORT, supra note 8, at 12-13.
156. Sorry, Privacy Act Standard Answer from Officials, Oklahoma

City, Oklahoman, March 28, 1976.
157. Privacy Act provides bureaucraticfield day, Aberdeen South Dakota American News, Jan. 26, 1976.
158. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (3), (a) (7).
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In discussing the final language of the Act, Senator Irvin and
Congressman Moorhead in similar statements said that '[t]he
compromise definition should serve as a caution to agencies to
think out in advance what uses it will make of information. This
Act is not intended to impose undue burdens on the transfer of
information to the Treasury Department to complete payroll
checks, the receipt of information by the Social Security Administration to complete quarterly posting of accounts, or other such
housekeeping measures and necessarily frequent interagency or
intra-agency transfers of information. It is, however, intended to
discourage the unnecessary exchange of information to other
persons or to agencies who may not be as sensitive to the collecting9 agency's reasons for using and interpreting the mate15
rial.'
Initially, overreaction and misunderstanding created problems for some agencies in implementing the routine use provision.
The Civil Service Commission, for example, had difficulty persuading other agencies in the executive branch to send personnel
files that it was required to obtain. 160
Throughout the federal bureaucracy, however, there is agreement that the routine use requirement has not imposed a significant burden upon information exchanges. Interviews for this
study suggest that the difficulty may have been alleviated in
part, by the development of techniques designed specifically to
Many routine use
circumvent the routine use restrictions.
notices authorize transfers of information for purposes which
by no stretch of the imagination are compatible with the purpose
for which the information was first collected.
On June 5, 1975, the Department of Justice sent a memorandum to heads of all executive departments and agencies requesting that each agency publish a routine use notice authorizing the
transfer of information to a law enforcement agency where the
information indicates a violation or potential violation of
law."" In the same memorandum, the Attorney General encouraged agencies to publish routine use notices for the transfer
of information to agencies conducting employment and security
clearance investigations. Department of Justice sources readily
admit that there is no way such uses, now adopted by almost
every federal agency, comport with the Act's definition of a
1 62
routine use.
159. OMB Guidelines, supra note 17, at 28,953 (citing 120 CONG. REc.
S21,816 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974); id. H12,244 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974)).

160. Schneider Interview, supra note 86.
161. See Memorandum from the Attorney General to the heads of all
executive departments and agencies, Office of the Attorney General,
Washington, D.C. on the Implementation of Privacy Act of 1974 Routine
Uses of Information (June 5, 1975).
162. Lawton Interview, supra note 90.
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Law enforcement transfers are by no means the only routine
use notices that depart from the concept as defined in the Act.
For instance, initially many agencies withheld personal information from congressional caseworkers who were seeking help for
constituents. The Congress complained bitterly and in October
of 1975, OMB advised agencies to regard disclosure to congressmen as a routine use permitted under the Act.'1

3

In reality,

of course, there is no assurance that congressmen will use the
information they receive from this transfer in a way that is compatible with the purpose for which the information was first
collected.
Many agencies have also established routine use provisions
for medical data that violate the Act's requirement. An informal survey by the Domestic Council Committee on the Right of
Privacy found that many agencies make it a routine use to share
medical information with law enforcement agencies, notwithstanding the fact that in almost all instances medical information
was initially collected for reasons related to the subject's health
care.
Another common routine use that is probably inconsistent
with the Act's definition provides for the release of information
to the news media. Like the Congress and law enforcement
agencies, the news media has clout with most agencies and can
use the release
effectively pressure agencies to treat as a routine
64
to the news media of information in their files.'
Laundering of Information
Perhaps the greatest potential for abuse of the Privacy Act's
routine use provision flows from the statute's definition of an
agency. That "definition" merely recites that the term "agency"
includes "any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or
other establishment in the executive branch of the Government
... or any independent regulatory agency."' 16 5 Federal agencies, no matter how large or heterogenous, have taken advantage
of this broad definition to define themselves as a single agency.
Because transfers within a single agency are accomplished on a
"need-to-know basis," without serious check or limitation, the
routine use provision can be avoided altogether. Therefore, agen163. 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741-42 (1975).
164. See 40 Fed. Reg. 56,465 (1975).
165. 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Privacy Act, (a)
(1), defines agency by incorporating the definition in the FOIA which
refers the reader to section 551(1) of Title 5 for a full definition in
addition to summarizing what the term agency includes.
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cies as large as the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
are able to trade sensitive personal information on a "need-toknow basis" among their own units as diverse as the Social
Security Administration, the Student Loan Office, the Indian
Health Service, the National Institute of Mental Health, and the
Parent Locator Service. In a letter to Mr. John Ottina, Assistant
Secretary for Administration and Management of HEW, OMB
urged HEW to avoid transfers of personal information among
its units unless made for compatible purposes.
It is noted that HEW has elected to define agency for purposes
of the Act as including all elements of the Department rather
than treating elements within the Department as separate agencies. (HEW Rules, Section 5b.3(a) (b); FDA Rule § 7.3(f) ).
While this is not technically inconsistent with the Privacy Act,
in the context of an agency as large and complex as HEW, this
interpretation creates a possibility of abuse by permitting inappropriate free interchange among elements of the agency.
Therefore, care should be taken to insure that this interpretation
is not used in such a way as to evade the intent of the Act,
i.e., the disclosure of information from a record should be on
a need-to-know basis and only for a purpose compatible
with
166
that for which the information was originally gathered.
It appears that OMB's admonition has been ignored. A
prime example is the information "shell game" played by HEW's
Parent Locator Service (PLS). The PLS is a small unit charged
with locating absent parents whose children are receiving state
or federal welfare benefits. Before its creation in 1974, and prior
to enactment of the Privacy Act, state units that performed
similar tracking functions were generally able to obtain parent
locator information from HEW's Social Security Administration.
After passage of the Privacy Act, the Social Security Administration decided that it was improper for it to continue transfers
of this information, because the data would not be used by state
locator services for purposes which were compatible with the
reason for which the Social Security Administration had originally collected the data. This decision generated considerable
controversy and eventually involved Secretary Matthew's office,
the Congress, and the White House. At length, the Secretary decided that HEW's own Parent Locator Service should obtain the information from the Social Security Administration on
an intra-agency need-to-know basis.1 7 The federal PLS then
166. Letter from Office of Management and Budget to John Ottina
(Dec. 15, 1975).
167. In their defense, Department of Health, Education and Welfare
officials believed, in view of the Privacy Act's definitional latitude, that
they had no real option but to define the agency as "one agency."
Furthermore, the Social Security Administration gave notice of its intention to amend its regulations to permit the internal transfer of information to the Parent Locator Service. 44 Fed. Reg. 16,561 (1976),
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published a routine use notice authorizing the transfer of parent
locator information to state units.
Under even the most charitable interpretation, this scheme
amounts to little more than an information "laundering" service
by HEW's Parent Locator Service. HEW's PLS "collects" the
information from the Social Security Administration for the purpose of tracking down the missing parents, 168 clearly not the
reason for which the information was originally gathered. A literal interpretation of the Act's routine use provision then permits
the PLS to transfer that information to state units which will
use the data for the same tracking purpose. This study was
unable to document whether other agencies take advantage of
the ease of intra-agency transfers to "launder" information before transferring it pursuant to a routine use notice.
Some Transfers Discouraged
Despite the abuse of the Act's routine use provision, evidence
that some inter-agency transfers have been discouraged by the
Privacy Act was found. Transfers of information which is of little importance to an agency are likely to be discontinued if the
transfer does not fit neatly within the routine use requirements.
The Department of Justice, for instance, previously transferred
information about applicants rejected for its attorney honors program to other agencies which might be interested in these applicants. After passage of the Privacy Act, the Department abandoned this practice because it was simply too much trouble. 169
Other agencies have ceased or limited transfers, not because
of obstacles posed by routine use requirements, but because they
fear that the receiving agency may be unable to protect the information. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI) reports that it no longer shares detailed investigative
information, but instead merely provides a summary to its consumer agencies. AFOSI claims that it does not want its full
investigative files subjected to access requests from agencies that
may be forced to disclose the information once it is in their possession because they are unable to take advantage of the law
70
enforcement exemptions available to AFOSI.1
168. Query whether an organization such as the Parent Locator Service, which is not an agency for purposes of the Act, can nonetheless establish a new purpose for information use by receiving that information
on a "need-to-know" basis.
169. Lawton Interview, supra note 90.
170. Cavaney Interview, supra note 50.
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Accounting Requirement
Transfers made for a routine use, as well as most transfers
authorized by the Privacy Act (except for transfers made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act or intra-agency transfers), must be accounted for and recorded. Subsection c of the
Privacy Act, "Accounting of Certain Disclosures," provides:
each agency with respect to each system of records under its
control, shall . . . keep an accurate accounting of (A) the date,
nature and purpose of each disclosure of a record to any person
or to another agency made under Subsection b of this Section,
and (B) the name and 7address
of the person or agency to whom
1
the disclosure is made.3
The Act requires that agencies retain the accounting for at least
five years or the life of the record, whichever is longer. Furthermore, with minor limitations, the agency must make the accounting available to the individual named in the record at that individual's request. This provision has a two-fold impact on agencies: first, agencies know that, if they are going to make a transfer, they have certain accounting and paperwork responsibilities;
second, the subject of the disclosure will be able to learn of the
nature of the transfer, if he so chooses.
A number of agencies have indicated that the accounting
requirement is costly and burdensome. Sources reported that
next to the system notice and (e) (3) collection of information
notice provisions, the accounting requirements constitute the
172
largest paperwork burden under the Act.
The Department of Defense has indicated its concern with
the burdensome accounting requirements.
The requirement to account for all routine disclosures is extremely burdensome. For example, within DOD GAO routinely
audits pay records on a daily basis and the entire system on
a quarterly basis to determine if procedures are correct. Each
disclosure under the Act requires an accounting and in this instance we question the value of such an accounting considering
the immense costs involved. Likewise other routine accounting
for disclosures to other
governmental agencies is extremely bur173
densome and costly.
The Guaranteed Student Loan Program at HEW has been
unable to comply with the accounting provisions. As a consequence, HEW requires students who apply for guaranteed loans
to "waive" their right to see the accounting of disclosures. The
legality of this practice has been challenged by several student
171. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c) (1) (A)-(B) (Supp. V 1975).
172. Schneider Interview, supra note 86.
173. DPB Briefing, supra note 65, at 24.
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loan applicants in a suit pending in United States District
17 4
Court.
Transfer of Personal Information to State and Local
Governments and Private Sector
Organizations
There is a continuous flow of personal information from federal files to state and local government agencies and private organizations. In the months following the passage of the Privacy
Act, in some instances the flow was interrupted or shut off altogether. In May of 1974, the Veterans Administration reinterpreted its own statute and interpreted the Privacy Act so strictly
that it advised administrators of VA hospitals that they could
no longer notify local police when patients with gun shot
wounds were admitted, and local administrators were warned
that they could not report cases of communicable diseases to state
health departments. This strict interpretation of the Act pro17 5
voked an outcry in the Congress and among state officials.
Congress subsequently amended the Veterans Administration's
statute to make it clear that the VA could release communicable
i7 6
disease and gun shot wound information.
Federal officials tell horror stories of the consequences that
ensued when some federal agencies initially cut off information
to state governments. One such story concerns an Oklahoma
state trooper who was reportedly involved in a high speed chase
that ultimately resulted in a collision. The suspect was rushed
to a nearby VA hospital and subsequently identified by hospital
officials. Despite pleas from the trooper and his superiors, the
hospital refused to disclose the suspect's identity allegedly because they believed that the Privacy Act, prohibited the disclosure. State police obtained a warrant for the information, but
not before the suspect regained consciousness and checked him1 77
self out against medical advice.
The OMB Report describes the initial overreaction of some
agencies:
Initially, agencies experienced some difficulty in determining
whether certain types of disclosures are compatible with the purposes for which records are maintained and therefore, could be
established as routine uses. Over the years, for example, units
174. Hettig v. Matthews, No. C-762697 (N.D. Calif. Dec. 2, 1976).
175. See, e.g., Privacy For Shootings, Des Moines, Iowa Register,
Oct. 4, 1975; Privacy Law and Public Health, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 31,
1975.

176. 38 U.S.C. § 3301(a) (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-321
(1976).
177. Lawton Interview, supra note 90.
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of state and local government have become dependent on federal
agencies for verifying entitlement to a variety of programs including food stamps, unemployment compensation and both federally and locally funded income maintenance and assistance programs. In many cases, initial implementation of the Act resulted
in the denial of information needed for the conduct of these programs by state and local governments. In many of those cases
appropriate, "routine uses" have been established to permit the
disclosure of this information to units of state and local government without the consent of the individual. In those instances
where it has been concluded that the written consent of the subject of a record is required (e.g. access to social security records
for verifying eligibility for food stamps) statements authorizing
access to agency records have
been incorporated into state and
178
local aid application forms.
OverreactionEnds
Agency overreaction to the Privacy Act and consequent reduction of dissemination of personal information outside the
federal government has ceased. In fact, some sources suspect
that the very same pattern of abuse that marks inter-agency
transfers now characterizes the transfer of personal information
from the federal government to state or private recipients. 17 9
The study indicates, however, that the Privacy Act continues
to limit federal, state and local government and private sector
transfers of personal information in some areas. Officials in
state executive and legislative offices who perform the same kind
of case work that the staffs of federal congressmen perform are
without the benefit of the Congress' new routine use provision
and consequently they claim their effectiveness has been compromised. One administrative aide to a governor stated that "while
the purpose of the Act was admirable its practical effects were
to increase the length of time and the amount of paperwork required to resolve citizens' problems with federal agencies, and
possibly to leave the erroneous impression with constituents that
the Governor was unresponsive to their problems."' 180
This article has already alluded to the impact that the
Privacy Act has had on personal information that HEW shares
178. OMB REPORT, supra note 8, at 13.
179. Interview with James Davidson, Counsel, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, Senate Committee on Government Operations,
in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 9, 1976). Carole Parsons, Executive Director
of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, recently testified that her
staff has found some evidence that transfers among federal, state and
local agencies are an area of abuse. See S.3425, A Bill to Increase
an Authorization of Appropriations for the Privacy Protection Study
Commission, Hearings by the Subcommittee on Government Information
and Individual Rights of the House Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 34 (1976).
180. New U.S. Privacy Law Creating Problems, Aide to Governor Declares, Little Rock, Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 5, 1975.
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with various state agencies. This information includes data collected by the Social Security Administration such as wage record
data, supplementary insurance data, and information concerning
eligibility for cash payment benefits. Despite pressure from
the states, HEW has refused to establish routine uses for the
transfer of some of this information. Therefore, some of these
transfers must now be authorized by the subject, albeit that
these authorizations generally take the form of blanket consents signed at the time of application. Nevertheless, even this
perfunctory consent should help to acquaint the subject with the
uses that will be made of the information and at least theoretically give the individual some control over that use.
Other agencies have also indicated that because of the
Privacy Act, they have eliminated or reduced dissemination of
personal information to non-federal organizations. The Department of Defense reports that it may stop providing labor unions
with the same type of personal information that it did prior to
the enactment of the Privacy Act.
In some instances we have agreements with labor unions
which require us to provide them with certain personal information relating to DOD personnel. This includes such material as
civilian promotion files which contain evaluations and personal
information about all candidates. This is to permit the union
to make their own evaluation as to the merit promotion program.
It is questionable whether or not such information can be provided under the "routine uses" of the Act. We are releasing
that information which is releasable under the Freedom of Information Act but have not resolved the problem for that which
would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri18 1
vacy.

FBI officials feel that they are now unable to provide private
sector organizations with as much information as was possible
before the passage of the Privacy Act. As evidence, an FBI
source described two recent incidents involving bank investigations. In one case the FBI suspected a bank employee of embezzling. Before the existence of the Privacy Act, the FBI would
have informed the bank of its suspicions but here it did not.
In another instance, FBI agents had three suspects under surveillance whom they suspected were planning to rob a bank. According to the interviewee, the agents did not inform the bank
that it might be a target of a robbery, because they felt con82
strained by the Privacy Act.'

181. DPB Briefing, supra note 65, at 25.
182. Dennis Interview, supra note 57.
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CONCLUSION

Analysis of Fair Information PracticeStandards
This study, taken alone, does not provide a basis for final
judgments about the information impact of agency compliance
with the Privacy Act and the amended Freedom of Information
Act. The Acts are relatively new and still developing. Furthermore, the "findings" of this study are of necessity dependent on
anecdotal and impressionistic research. Nevertheless, the study
is a warning signal of possible problem areas.
The trends revealed suggest that after a year and one-half
of experience with the Privacy Act, there should be some doubt
about the conceptual validity and practicability of the fair information practice principles upon which the Act rests. Federal
policy makers have accepted fair information practice principles
as gospel. This study suggests that some of that faith may have
been misplaced.
The concept of fair information practice was best articulated
in a report by HEW's Secretary's Advisory Committee on Auto8 3
mated Personal Data Systems.1'
The "fair information practice code" includes perhaps seven basic standards:
1. There should be no systems containing personal information whose very existence is secret.
2. Organizations should collect only personal information
needed by the organization for a lawful purpose.
3. The subject of the information should have access to his
records.
4. The subject should have the ability to correct and amend
8 4
his records.'
5. Information obtained for one purpose should be used
only for purposes compatible with that purpose (in effect, a confidentiality provision).
6. The organization maintaining personal information must
take responsibility to ensure that the records are maintained with
the degree of accuracy, relevance and timeliness needed to make
a fair decision.
183. HEW

SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL
DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
xxiii-

xxxii (1973).
184. This study did not look in any depth at the subject's ability to
correct and amend his records under the Privacy Act. As noted in the
body of this article, few agencies reported any significant number of Privacy Act access requests. A fortiori, there was little reason to investigate
the impact of challenge and correction rights. Agency sources queried

on this point unanimously stated that the amendment provisions had not
been used to any appreciable extent and had not had a significant impact

on agency information practices.
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7. The information must be maintained with a degree of
security requisite to safeguard the data.
As implemented in the Privacy Act, these fair information
principles take on something of a hollow ring. Publication in
the Federal Register is an ineffective method for ensuring that
a system of records is not secret. Initially, the very act of publishing descriptions of record systems may have an impact on
agency record keepers and policymakers; however, in the absence
of significant attention by subjects or by guardian groups in the
government or the private sector, the effectiveness of publication
may soon be diminished. Personal notice to the subject that information about him is maintained in the system-a provision
debated by the Congress and discarded as too burdensome-may
prove to be the only effective publication method.
Collection standards in the Privacy Act (including those
standards couched in terms of "maintenance") may be too vague
and too modest to have much impact on agency information practices. The Act permits agencies to continue to define their own
collection needs (in keeping, of course, with applicable congressional and executive branch direction). Of course, it may well
be that agency discretion for the collection of personal information should not be abridged by comprehensive privacy legislation.
Critics argue that if you control an agency's information collection standards, you control the substantive standards and activities of that agency. The point to be drawn from this study is
not necessarily that new, substantive collection standards must
be established, but rather that we should be aware that the
collection standard articulated as a part of fair information practice standards and more or less expressed in the Privacy Actcollect only information necessary for a lawful purpose-should
not be relied on as a substitute for resolution of the debate over
collection policy.
Perhaps the single finding from the study that can be advanced with near dogmatic confidence concerns the Act's routine
use requirements. There is evidence that agencies ignore routine
use requirements whenever officials believe that data exchanges
must be made. Certainly the study indicates that the Privacy
Act's dissemination concept as principally embodied in the routine use concept fails when it is subject to the wholesale exceptions (such as the "need-to-know" and "releasable under the
Freedom of Information Act" standards) permitted by the Privacy Act. As a practical matter, the Act allows agencies to define for themselves the meaning and application of a routine use.
The only review is publication in the Federal Register.
The adequacy of the routine use requirement is not only a
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matter of practical implementation; it is also a question of conceptual validity. It may be that the principle-"personal information collected for one purpose should only be used for purposes compatible with that purpose"-is too simplistic. Perhaps
transfer of some kinds of personal information held by the government (or, for that matter, held by other organizations),
should be governed by different standards; standards that for
some data would be strict and for other data would be flexIndeed, many agency officials argue that the result of
ible.'" '
conscientious application of the routine use concept would be
chaos. They claim that, had agencies taken the routine use requirement seriously, there would have been frightful inefficiency, duplication of collection, waste of resources and extraordinary operational costs.
Analysis of the findings of the study also indicates that the
fair information practice principle-that personal information
should be maintained with relevance, timeliness and accuracy
and in a setting that guarantees reasonable security, at least in
the form expressed in the Privacy Act-may be too vague a standard to be implemented. In a context of scarce resources and
mission imperatives, many agencies ignored or downplayed these
provisions.
Our notions about the beneficial effects of subject access to
his record may also need some rethinking. There is tentative evidence that subjects, are not interested in obtaining access to
information about themselves held by the government, except
that held by intelligence and criminal justice agencies. Ironically, the Privacy Act exempts most of the information maintained by those agencies from such access. This study suggests
the need for a public education program and questions the wisdom of reliance on the threat of access to improve agency
information practices. The old saw that the people get only as
good as a system as they deserve was perhaps never more true
than as regards the utility of access rights for an indifferent public.
Recommendations
This study and the foregoing discussion raise questions about
reform of the Privacy Act and perhaps the Freedom of Informa185. For example, the Buckley Amendment, enacted as the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (a) (Supp.
V 1975), Pub. L. No. 93-380, specifically defines 10 circumstances under
which a school may release student record information without the consent of the student or his parents. Most observers claim that, despite
a good deal of initial congressional confusion, the Buckley Amendment

has worked well.
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tion Act. A detailed analysis of possible amendments to the Privacy Act or reform of fair information practice standards, is
beyond the scope of this article. It is appropriate, however, to
identify, at least in capsule form, areas for discussion and potential reform.
*The definition section of the Privacy Act needs attention:
including rewording of the definition of "agency" and the definition of systems of records covered by the Act.
*Collection standards: including the Act's prohibition on collection of first amendment information; and consideration of
the identification of specific types of personal information that
should be subject to collection standards.
*Maintenance standards: including consideration of the development of specific audit requirements, security requirements,
personnel training and regulation requirements, and development of purging standards and schedules, and standards for timeliness, relevance and accuracy.
*Dissemination standards: including consideration of a more
protective and specific definition of confidentiality; reform of the
intra-agency "need-to-know" standard and reform of the routine
use standard.
*Access rights: including consideration of a public education
program, and a more effective notice system including personal
notice requirements; reform of access exemptions for law enforcement, intelligence, civil investigative and medical information.
*Consideration of the creation of a centralized regulatory
authority.
One general conclusion emerges from an analysis of the
information gathered in this study. The Congress must reexamine and reform the federal government's standards for
handling personal information as expressed in the Privacy Act.
Although the nation has made remarkable progress in a relatively short period of time in recognizing and alleviating many
of the problems caused by society's handling of personal information, there is more work to be done. Developing and implementing fair information practice standards for the collection, maintenance and use of personal information is a more difficult task
than first imagined. Recent amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, and, more directly, enactment of the Privacy Act,
are critical and difficult initial steps in the effective regulation
of the nation's use of personal information. However, it is likely
that they are only first steps in a lengthy process of establishing
a conceptual and practicable framework within which to regulate
society's use of personal information.
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